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The landscape in which energy and telecommunications utilities operate has changed 
dramatically over the past two decades. Monolithic structures which were previously publicly 
owned have been vertically separated, privatized or given strictly commercial, profit-maximizing 
mandates. The corporations that have emerged are often diversified and exhibit sophisticated 
corporate structures. In particular, a structure that appears worldwide is that of a holding 
company which has ownership interests across a number of activities where not all those 
activities are regulated. 
 
Examples are plentiful: UK-based Centrica operates in gas and electricity transmission, in 
competitive segments of energy sectors as well as in telecommunications and financial services; 
France’s Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, Germany’s RWE and Italy’s Enel operate across regulated 
and unregulated markets in energy and other utility sectors. There are also a multitude of 
municipal enterprises in Europe (e.g. in Italy and Scandinavian countries) which are locally 
embedded but offer a wide array of services both in regulated and unregulated sectors. AGL is 
one of Australia's leading integrated energy companies with interests that include retail and 
merchant energy businesses, power generation assets and an upstream gas portfolio. In the 
United States, one third of over two hundred existing electricity retailers such as Northern States 
Power and Potomac Electric and Power Company also offer telecommunication services. Local 
telephone service operators such as Regional Bell Operating Companies also provide 
unregulated broadband Internet services.  
 
Although in many of the examples above diversification resulted in corporate structures with 
ownership interests in more than one utility sector (and potentially subject to price regulation 
across different sectors), the focus of this paper is on diversification into unregulated (and 
potentially unrelated) markets. Examples of this type of diversification include the leasing by 
Potomac Electric Power of Boeing 747s to KLM and Singapore Airlines; the acquisition by FPL 
Group (formerly Florida Power & Light) of the insurance company Colonial Penn Group; the 
purchase by Pacific Lighting Corp of a chain of drug stores and the acquisition by Pinnacle West 




                                                 
1  For example; Jandik and Makhija (2005).   3
The existing economics literature on the diversification of regulated firms which is reviewed in the 
next section, focuses on the firm’s incentive or ability to transfer costs from the unregulated to the 
regulated business. The standard concern within the literature highlights the need for increased 
regulatory oversight post diversification to prevent the regulated business claiming higher 
regulated prices and competing unfairly in the unregulated market.  
 
This paper, however, examines the problem of contamination, which emerges in its simplest form 
when a utility that operates only in a regulated market invests in an unregulated market affecting 
its own credit rating. In our framework and given that the utility is the most efficient provider of the 
unregulated business (up to a particular capacity), it is desirable that it be allowed to operate in 
that market. However, as the risk faced by a diversified utility is greater than the risk faced by a 
utility that does not diversify, it is likely that the utility’s credit rating will be affected. Consequently, 
ceteris paribus, the cost of debt for a utility that operates only in a regulated market is lower than 
for a diversified utility that operates in an unregulated market as well. This increases the cost of 
capital for the regulated business that will be recovered from ratepayers. We show that by 
allowing a regulated firm to diversify into an unregulated market the regulator faces a trade-off: a 
lower cost in the unregulated market versus a higher cost in the regulated market. If the regulator 
only cares about welfare in the regulated market, then a ring-fencing requirement is optimal, 
subject to implementation costs being insubstantial. As the ring-fencing requirement prevents the 
firm from achieving a lower cost in the unregulated market, under certain conditions ring-fencing 
will not be optimal for a regulator that is concerned about welfare in both markets. A distinction 
from earlier literature is that it is the market that provides the incentive for firm cross-
subsidisation. Cross-subsidisation is not a strategic choice for the regulated firm.  
 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature on diversification by 
utilities; Section 3 discusses some of the institutional features of the interaction between the 
existence of ring-fencing, which aims as isolating risk, and credit rating; Section 4 introduces the 
model; Section 5 investigates when it is socially optimal to ring-fence the regulated business in 
order to avoid the contamination problem, and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Existing Literature on Diversification  
 
There are many explanations of why regulated firms have been allowed to expand and diversify 
into unregulated markets. Lewis and Sappington (1989) develop a model in which earnings in the 
unregulated market are positively correlated with costs in the regulated market. In this setting, the 
firm's incentive to exaggerate production costs in the regulated market is mitigated because such   4
an exaggeration implies a claim that participation in the unregulated market is more profitable 
than it actually is. The regulator's task of controlling cost exaggeration in the regulated market 
can actually be made less burdensome by allowing participation in unregulated markets. Given 
this, a regulator may be able to enhance the level of expected consumer surplus in a regulated 
market by allowing the regulated firm to enter unregulated markets. 
 
Palmer (1991) investigates the implications of a firm's decision to diversify into an unregulated 
market for both a firm's incentive to innovate and for the level of consumer welfare. The 
technology is assumed to exhibit economies of scale in the production of the regulated product as 
well as economies of scope in the joint production of the two products when the cost function for 
the regulated product has both fixed and variable components. Investment in R&D reduces both 
components through an innovation factor. If the firm seeks to diversify into the production of the 
unregulated product, it must obtain the approval of the regulator who may simultaneously lower 
the regulated revenue requirement and the regulated price in this period. This is accomplished by 
shifting the allocation of a fraction θ of the fixed cost of producing the regulated product to the 
unregulated product.  
 
The regulator chooses a value of θ that reflects his attitudes towards how the benefits of 
economies of scope should be split between the regulated and unregulated markets. Under this 
rule, the firm diversifies if θ is below the firm's breakeven level, θ*. The diversified firm chooses a 
higher level of R&D investment and consumers of the regulated product are better off if the 
regulated firm diversifies because of the lower average revenue requirement. Over time, the 
policy of sharing fixed costs will lead to higher consumer welfare gains even if the diversified 
firm's R&D investment is biased toward fixed-cost-reducing R&D.  
 
Palmer’s analysis assumes that the regulator is able to distinguish joint and attributable costs and 
accurately assess, ex post, the effects of R&D investment on the firm's cost function. If the 
regulator is unable to categorize costs or to observe cost reductions, then the negative effects of 
cross subsidisation, distorted technology choice (or both), may outweigh any long-run benefits to 
consumers from reduced costs. 
 
Another stream of literature investigates the potential negative consequences that result from the 
ability of the regulated firm to shift costs from the unregulated market to the regulated market. 
Braeutigam and Panzar (1989), for example, study the incentives for firms to shift costs from 
competitive to monopoly markets across two types of regulatory policies: rate-of-return and price-
cap regulation. They conclude that rate-of-return regulation provides the firm with incentive to 
misreport cost allocations and in some cases to choose an inefficient technology, undertake cost-  5
reducing innovation in an inefficient way, under-produce and price below cost in the competitive 
market. In contrast, pure price-cap regulation can induce the firm to minimize costs, produce 
efficiently in non-core markets, undertake cost-reducing innovation as an unregulated firm would, 
and diversify into a non-core market if and only if diversification is efficient. There is then no 
incentive to misreport cost allocations and choose an inefficient technology since cost allocation 
is not required under this regulatory scheme.  
 
Brennan (1990) analyses two cross-subsidization tactics – costs misallocation and distorted 
technological choice – under a spectrum of regulatory cost allocation policies. In his model, 
output in the regulated market will be reduced as higher prices are set by the regulator to fund the 
cross-subsidy. In the unregulated market, the price may fall below true marginal production cost 
and efficient production by others may be displaced. Moreover, if competitors in the unregulated 
market are large and thus render game theoretic considerations as more important, the potential 
for cross-subsidization may enable a regulated firm to maintain a monopoly price in an 
unregulated market. However, where there are economies of scope, increasing the regulated 
firm's share in the unregulated market at the expense of its competitors may increase welfare. 
The marginal inefficiency from overproduction of the competitive good by a regulated firm or over-
utilization of the regulated good by a vertically related firm, may be outweighed by the marginal 
gain when such production generates economies of scope that benefit ratepayers.  
 
Brennan and Palmer (1994) identify conditions under which gains from economies of scope and 
increased competition in unregulated markets tend to outweigh the costs of cross-subsidization. 
They use a perfect competition model of the unregulated market to examine trade-offs under 
economies of scope. Effects of increased competition are assessed using Cournot models with 
linear and constant elasticity demands. They show that diversification trade-offs depend on 
variables that regulators should be able to estimate. For instance, the likelihood of a welfare loss 
rises as the elasticity of demand, level of competition in the unregulated market, or the size of the 
cross-subsidy grows.  
 
Brennan and Palmer show that, with no fixed costs, diversification is beneficial when it leads to 
net entry. However, diversification in the presence of fixed costs leads to welfare gains only if the 
unregulated market is highly concentrated and demand is weakly inelastic. When there are 
economies of scope, cross-subsidized diversification is more likely to enhance welfare the larger 
the economies of scope, the smaller the cross-subsidy, or the smaller the firm's elasticity of 
supply for the unregulated product. Diversification can reduce welfare even without a loss in the 
regulated market if cross-subsidy induces inefficient production and economies of scope are not   6
extensive. Economies of scope appear to lend more support for diversification than does 
increased competition.  
 
More recent literature focuses on the optimal design of regulation to account for the possibility of 
diversification into unregulated markets. Sappington (2003) develops a model where effort can be 
allocated to regulated and unregulated activities. In this framework, horizontal diversification can 
provide important benefits for customers of the firm’s core regulated service. In particular, some 
of the profit the firm earns in non-core markets can be taxed (explicitly or implicitly) and delivered 
to core customers. However, diversification may harm core customers if the prospect of 
significant profit in non-core markets induces the regulated firm to divert its creative energies from 
its core market to non-core markets.  
 
Sappington investigates this trade off and concludes that diversification would be advantageous 
for core customers if the effort diversion problem were not present and if the regulator were well 
informed about operations in non-core markets (and so able to distinguish between necessary 
and unnecessary expenditures by the regulated firm in these markets). Under these conditions, a 
regulator who is capable of perfectly monitoring the firm’s allocation of cost-reducing effort across 
markets would always authorize diversification.  
 
In contrast, a combination of effort diversion and cost padding problems may lead the regulator to 
prohibit diversification. Moreover, a regulator is more likely to prohibit diversification when its 
knowledge of non-core markets is limited, when the incremental surplus that the regulated firm is 
certain to secure in non-core markets is small, or when the potential cost variation in the core 
market is large (in this case, the gains from reducing costs in the core market are large).  
 
In addition, the regulator may authorize diversification into a given non-core market when the 
impact of the firm’s cost-reducing effort in the core market (and thus the potential loss from effort 
diversion) is substantial, but preclude diversification when the impact is more limited. Whenever 
the regulator authorizes diversification, he admits profit in the core market that increases as 
realized operating costs decline. Doing so limits the incentive of the regulated firm to divert effort 
from its core operations to its non-core operations.  
 
Finally, Calzolari and Scarpa (2007) study the regulation of a utility firm which, when it jointly 
operates in competitive and unregulated sectors, enjoys economies of scope. The size of scope 
economies is assumed to be private information. These authors show that if scope economies 
are significant, consumers in the two markets may benefit from the efficiency gain of integrated 
production. The lack of information on the part of the regulator and the behaviour of the rival firms   7
in the competitive sector distort the price in the regulated market and may negatively impact on 
competition in the unregulated market. Nevertheless, on balance, the authors show that allowing 
the utility to operate in the competitive market is desirable.  
 
While the above literature focuses by and large on the incentives for and consequences of cost 
misallocation between unregulated and regulated markets, this paper focuses instead on the 
contamination problem. In order to understand how contamination might come about, it is useful 
to review the current credit agencies’ practices when rating utilities. This is the subject of the next 
Section.  
3. Ring-Fencing and Credit Rating 
 
Ring-fencing generally involves techniques to insulate the credit risk of an issuer from the risks of 
affiliate issuers within a corporate structure.
2 These techniques include, among others: capital 
structure requirements; dividend restrictions; unregulated investment restrictions; prohibitions on 
utility asset sales; collateralization requirements; working capital restrictions; prohibitions on inter-
company loans; maintenance of stand-alone bonds and independence of board members.
3 
 
The relationship between ring-fencing and credit rating is explicitly considered by credit rating 
agencies. For example, Moody’s rating methodology for regulated electric utilities comprises   
assessment of five elements: (i) the extent of a regulated company’s exposure to its unregulated 
businesses – the strongest credit risk position is enjoyed by a company whose business is wholly 
regulated and where non-utility activities are substantial, the main credit driver will be the 
assessment of these businesses; (ii) the credit support that is gained from operating within a 
particular regulatory framework, including ring-fencing mechanisms; (iii) the exact level of risk 
posed by the unregulated businesses to the overall credit; (iv) six specific financial ratios which 
are considered the most useful when assessing an electric utility and the adjustments made to 
calculate these, and (v) more generic risk factors that are not specific to utility companies, e.g. the 
adequacy of liquidity arrangements and the appetite for acquisitions.
4 
 
Moody’s methodology includes an assessment of the operations of the unregulated division in 
order to determine the overall rating of a firm. In particular, consideration is given to the extent of 
regulatory imposed ring-fencing restrictions on dividends, capital expenditures (CAPEX) and 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Bonelli et al (2003). 
3 See, for example, Regulatory Research Associates (2003) and Beach et al (2005). 
4 See Moody’s  (2005).   8
investments, separate financings, separate legal structure and limits on the ability of the regulated 
entity to support its parent or affiliate company.  
 
Standard & Poor’s rating methodology explicitly states that the agency would rarely view the 
default risk of a regulated subsidiary as being substantially different from the credit quality of the 
consolidated economic entity, which would fully take into account the parent company’s 
obligations. Regulated subsidiaries can only be treated as exceptions to this rule if there are 
substantive ring-fencing mechanisms. In this case, the rating of the regulated subsidiary would be 
more reflective of its ‘stand-alone’ credit profile. As a corollary, the parent and affiliates rating is 
negatively affected in the presence of ring-fencing since they are deprived of full access to the 
subsidiary’s assets and cash flow.
5 
 
Finally, Fitch’s rating methodology states that it will generally undertake separate analysis of the 
respective probabilities of default when cash flows between a holding company and its 
subsidiaries are formally restricted via ring-fencing mechanisms. This will result in the assignment 
of different ratings when the two entities have different stand-alone credit profiles. Such ring-
fencing mechanisms can take the form of restricted dividend covenants or minimum financial 
ratios before paying subordinated inter-company loan obligations.
6 
 
The methodologies of the credit rating agencies discussed above suggest that in the absence of 
ring-fencing mechanisms, the rating of a firm is obtained by the aggregation of the risks facing 
both the regulated and unregulated divisions. This leads to a regulated division being penalized 
via a lower credit rating.  
 
The rationale for the importance given to ring-fencing mechanisms by the credit agencies’ 
methodologies relates to the possible financial losses that the regulated utility can suffer as a 
result of its linkage to the unregulated parent or affiliate companies. Burns and Murphy (2006) 
point out that these losses might occur when utility assets or revenue streams are used as 
collateral for upstream or affiliate loans, or when utility dividends or working capital are moved 
elsewhere in the holding company system and are not available to the utility when needed for 
utility investment to maintain safe, adequate, and reliable service.  
 
In addition, the holding company structure can lead to utility expenditures that support 
technological innovations of unregulated subsidiaries or affiliates within the corporate structure. 
However, the ultimate concern is that the financial viability of the utility business may be 
                                                 
5 See S & P, Standard and Poor (2007). 
6 See Fitch (2007).   9
threatened by losses incurred by the non-utility businesses. For example, West Pinnacle (parent 
of Arizona Public Service) was brought close to bankruptcy due to the disastrous performance of 
its savings and loan subsidiary, Merabank. The FPL Group had to divest its insurance subsidiary, 
Colonial Penn, because of the losses it generated. Indeed, based on this experience, FPL Group 
subsequently decided to abandon all diversified activities.
7   
 
The establishment of ring-fencing requirements to avoid this contamination problem and 
associated increase in the cost of capital of the regulated division is currently an important policy 
issue in the US with the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA 1935). 
The central goal of the successor statute, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005 
(PUHCA 2005), is to encourage the infusion of capital into the electric and gas industries by 
facilitating the efficient consolidation of electricity and gas companies.
8 Although PUCHA 2005 
provides the State’s Public Utility Commissions (PUC) and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) with access to records of holding companies and their affiliates, the repeal 
of PUHCA 1935 means that the federal regulatory oversight over holding companies and their 
affiliates has been reduced. However, some States have already established regulatory 
frameworks aimed at holding companies. Burns and Murphy (2006) give several examples of 
State ring-fencing structures. The Oregon Public Utility Commission, for instance, uses a case-
by-case ring-fencing approach which is implemented through its merger review process. 
 
Concern about the relationship among ring-fencing, diversification and risk is also present in the 
regulatory debate in the UK. Although licence conditions in the UK include explicit ring-fencing 
requirements, there is considerable variation among sectors. For instance, although nearly all 
water licences require an investment grade issuer credit rating, only one water company is 
prevented from engaging in non-core activities. In contrast, all the major network businesses in 
the energy sector have to retain an investment grade credit rating and are prevented from 
engaging in non-core activities.  
 
In particular, in 2005, Ofgem increased the restrictions offered by financial ring-fencing by 
formally adding cash lock-up provisions to licence conditions of all gas and electricity distribution 
businesses and announced its intention to introduce similar conditions in all other gas and 
electricity network licences. This mechanism is triggered when a licensee has the lowest level of 
credit rating consistent with investment grade (MIS Baa3, and for S&P and FitchRatings BBB-) 
and a credit rating agency has revised the rating outlook to negative or placed the licensee’s 
                                                 
7 See Jandik and Makhija (2005).  
8 See Burns and Murphy (2006).   10
rating on review for possible downgrade. With the exception of highly geared companies, such 
provisions are not formally incorporated into licences in the water sector.
9  
 
In 2002, the Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission (ICRC) reviewed ring-fencing 
requirements for gas and electricity network service providers in the Australian Capital Territory. 
ICRC (2002) states that in principle any business that operates in a competitive market which is 
associated with, or part of, another business that operates in a related upstream or downstream 
regulated market should be subject to ring-fencing rules. The rules potentially apply to all 
businesses that operate in the market where there is a risk that competition in the market might 
be reduced as a result of the business relationships between the entities. The guidelines include 
ring-fencing measures such as legally separating the network and retail parts of their businesses; 
ensuring that their marketing staff and certain other operational staff are not also staff of related 
businesses; physically separating the offices of network providers and related businesses; 
separating the information systems of network providers and related businesses; developing 
procedures for cost allocation, shared boards of management and complaints handling, and 
conducting any business with related (non-retail) businesses at arm’s length. 
 
This Section strongly suggests that credit rating agencies methodologies reflect a concern with 
the possibility of default contamination between regulated and unregulated businesses. This in 
turn suggests that the cost of debt of the regulated business might increase in the absence of 
ring-fencing mechanisms. This concern has been recently picked up by regulatory agencies in the 
US and in the UK. We label this concern the contamination problem; the idea that the revenue 
from the regulated business can be used, for instance, as collateral for investing in more risky 
competitive markets. In this case, the trade-off is between allowing the firm to diversify and 
(efficiently) invest in competitive markets and allowing rate payers to bear some of the risk of this 
efficient investment. Thus, this paper investigates the conditions under which it is optimal for the 
regulator to establish ring-fencing requirements in order to avoid the contamination problem. 
                                                 
9 See Ofwat and Ofgem (2006).    11
4. The Model  
 
We now examine the simple, but common, scenario where a holding firm has two subsidiaries. 
The first subsidiary operates in a regulated market and will be referred to as the Regulated 
Division. The second subsidiary operates in a competitive market and will be referred to as the 
Unregulated Division. An example is that of a holding company involved in an activity where it 
faces no competition (such as the transmission of electricity) and in an activity where it faces 
strong competition (such as in the provision of internet services).  
 
The underlying characteristics of the regulated and unregulated markets follow those specified in 
Sappington (2003). The Regulated Division is required to satisfy the entire demand at a regulated 
price R p . The demand in the regulated market is assumed to be perfectly inelastic at output level 




The unregulated market is characterized by competition among firms that produce a homogenous 
product with constant returns to scale. With no participation by the Unregulated Division, 
competition in the unregulated market drives the market price to the marginal cost of the least-
cost supplier, 
_
U c . The Unregulated Division is assumed to be the most efficient producer in the 
unregulated market due to, for instance, new technology implementation. Thus, the marginal cost 
of the Unregulated Division is always lower or equal to 
_
U c . For simplicity, consumer demand in 
the unregulated market is perfectly inelastic (up to a reserve price, 
_ _
U U c p ≥ ) at output level 
U Q
_
. The maximum production capacity of the Unregulated Division in the unregulated market is 
U U Q Q
_
< .   Thus, the profit-maximizing price for the Unregulated Division is 
_
U c , the marginal 
cost of the next most efficient producer in that market.  
 
There is a rating agency that is responsible for setting credit ratings for both the Regulated and 
Unregulated Divisions. The ratings are influenced by the existence of ring-fencing mechanisms 
separating the operations of the two divisions.  
 
In the presence of a ring-fencing mechanism, the rating agency treats the two divisions as 
independent businesses. The underlying assumption is that the rating agency perceives the   12
presence of a consistent set of ring-fencing mechanisms as a fully informative signal that the 
Regulated Division will not be contaminated (default risk) by its affiliate (the Unregulated Division) 
or its parent (the Holding). A perfectly insulated Regulated Division is seen by the rating agency 
as a low risk business, with low volatility of revenues.
10 In particular, in the presence of ring-
fencing mechanisms the ratings of the Regulated and Unregulated Divisions are given by, 
respectively, 
H
R φ  and 
L




U φ φ ≤ < 0 , where a high 
credit rating is, of course, better than a low rating.  
 
In the absence of ring-fencing, the analysis that follows assumes that the rating agency’s 
subjective evaluation considers the existence of a transfer of risk from the Unregulated Division to 
the Regulated Division. It is assumed that this transfer of risk is directly proportional to the 
Unregulated Division’s choice of output  U q . In particular, we postulate a direct relationship 
between  U q  and the credit rating of the two divisions.  First, the Regulated Division’s rating is 
given by a continuous, decreasing function  () RU q φ  that ranges from its highest value 
H
R φ  when 
0 U q =  to its lowest value  () U R Q φ . Moreover, the Unregulated Division’s rating is given by the 
continuous, increasing function   () UU q φ  ranging from its lowest value 
L
U φ  when  0 U q =  to its 
highest value  () U U Q φ .  
 
The underlying rationale for  () RU q φ  t o  d e c r e a s e  i s  t h a t   U q  measures the size of the 
Unregulated Division and, as a consequence, the extent of the Regulated Division’s exposure to 
its unregulated affiliate. The larger  U q , in the absence of  ring-fencing, the greater the scope to 
leverage part of the Regulated Division’s assets to support the Unregulated Division.  
 
Conversely, the underlying rationale for  () UU q φ to increase is due to the same fact that the larger 
U q , in the absence of  ring-fencing, the greater the scope for the Unregulated Division to be 
supported by part of the Regulated Division’s assets. In this sense, in unfavourable scenarios the 
                                                 
10  Standard rating methodology includes the analysis of both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the 
financial position of a firm. The former involves the analysis of specific financial ratios while the latter 
includes the use by the agency of its expertise on evaluating non-quantifiable factors that might influence 
the riskiness of firms operating in particular sectors. The analysis that follows assumes that the quantitative 
measures that influence each division’s rating have little weight or are neutral (i.e., the current financial and 
economic conditions faced by both divisions are considered equivalent) and what really matters are the 
qualitative factors of the rating setting. That is, the subjective perception of the rating agency regarding the 
overall risk faced by each business is the only differentiating factor when determining the credit ratings for 
the two divisions.     13
Unregulated Division’s obligations could be offset by using the assets from its regulated affiliate 
while keeping its own assets safe.      
 
It is further assumed that the credit rating function affects the marginal cost of each of the 
divisions. The underlying rationale is discussed at the end of subsection 4.1. In particular, we can 
write the Regulated Division’s marginal cost function as a continuous, increasing function 




R R C C = φ  when  0 U q =  to its 
highest value  () () U R R Q C φ . The Unregulated Division’s marginal cost function is given by a 





U U C C = φ  when  0 U q =  to its lowest value  ( ) ( ) U U U Q C φ . At a basic intuitive level, the 
impact of a change in the credit rating on the marginal cost function will depend on the amount of 
debt that is rolled and/or issued. We now examine this relationship in more detail.  
 
4.1 The Cost Function 
 
The postulated direct relationship between  U q  and the credit rating of the two divisions is 










 so that  ( ) 0 > U R q φ  for  U U Q q ≤              (1) 
 
 
 and  
 
               () U
L
U U U q q β φ φ + = , where β > 0 and  ( ) 0 > U U q φ  for any  U q         (2) 
 
In the presence of ring-fencing,  ()
H
RU R q φ φ =  and  ( )
L
UU U q φ φ = . 
 
It is further assumed that the credit rating function affects the marginal cost of each of the 
divisions as follows:  
 




( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) U U U U U U D q r W q C δ φ φ + =     (4) 
 
 
where  0 , > W K , and r  is the cost of debt function, which is the same function for both divisions 






= r                         (5) 
 
 
Moreover, we let  R D   denote the debt issued or rolled over throughout the period by the 
Regulated Division and γ  the Regulated Division’s debt amortization rate during that period.  U D  
denotes the debt issued or rolled over throughout the period by the Unregulated Division and δ  
is the Unregulated Division’s debt amortization rate. 
 
The underlying rationale for the marginal cost functions above is that firms finance investments 
and operating costs with both equity and debt. Moreover, short term debt is commonly used to 
finance operating costs and working capital requirements such as to expand a current facility, 
increase production and cover operating expenses. In this sense, at least a small part of the 
firm’s debt depends upon current production and it is then a variable cost. This component of the 
marginal cost is assumed to vary with changes in the cost of debt following a change in the credit 
rating of a division.  
 
It is worth noting that the cost of debt function has an inverse relation with the rating value. In this 
sense, an increase in the rating means that the division’s overall risk has decreased and, as a 
consequence, the market cost of debt decreases.  
 
5. Socially Optimal Ring-Fencing 
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This Section investigates when it is socially optimal to ring-fence the regulated business in order 
to avoid the contamination problem. While subsection 5.1 addresses the case  where the 
regulator only cares about welfare in the regulated market, subsection 5.2 examines the case 
where the regulator cares about welfare in both regulated and unregulated markets.  
 
5.1. Optimal Ring-Fencing under Limited Regulator’s Objective 
Function  
 
In this subsection, we consider a regulator who only cares about the welfare of consumers and 
the firm in the regulated market. First, we find the market outcomes and the associated total 
welfare in the regulated market in the absence of ring-fencing mechanism. In this case, the 
regulator solves the following maximization problem:     
() ( ) () [] {} R U R R R R R R p Q Q C p p p Q Max
R















() () [] 0 ≥ − R U R R R Q Q C p φ . 
 
where  λ denotes the weight assigned by the regulator to consumer surplus in the regulated 
market. Note that due to the unregulated market’s structure, the Unregulated Division will always 
produce at its maximum capacity; that is,  U U Q q = . In addition, the Regulated Division profit 
constraint is clearly binding and, therefore, the regulated price is set at marginal cost:   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) R U R U R R R D Q r K Q C p γ φ φ + = = . 
 
Consequently, the regulator’s utility is 


















− R U R R R U R R R R D Q r K p Q Q C p Q γ φ λ φ λ
_ _
.  
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We now consider the regulator’s problem in the presence of ring-fencing mechanisms which are 
costless to establish. In this case the regulator solves the following problem: 




















− λ λ 1
_








R Q C p . 
 
Again, it is clear that the Regulated Division profit constraint is binding and that, therefore, the 







R D r K C p γ φ + = = , which now avoids the contamination problem.   
 
Thus, in the absence of a ring-fencing structure, price in the regulated market increases by an 
amount equal to 
  




R U R R D r Q r C Q C γ φ φ φ − = − . 
 
Consequently, the regulator’s utility decreases by an amount equal to 
 
() () [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] R
H
R U R R
L
R U R R R D r Q r Q C Q C Q γ φ φ λ φ λ − = −           (8) 
 













      ( 9 )  
 
 
By definition we know that ( ) 0 > − U
H
R Q α φ so that expression (9) is greater than zero.  
 
We have just established the following result: 
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Proposition 1: When ring-fencing is costless and the regulator only considers the welfare in the 
regulated market, ring-fencing is always desirable.  
 
Moreover, from (9) above it is clear that the negative effects of diversification on the regulated 
market welfare are directly proportional to the initial conditions  α γ λ , , , , R R D Q  and  U Q . In 
addition, if the establishment of a ring-fencing structure creates an additional cost to the regulator 













≤ . Section 6 reviews the existing scant evidence on the costs of establishing 
ring-fencing mechanisms.  
 
5.2. Optimal Ring-Fencing under General Regulator’s Objective 
Function  
 
Now, suppose that the regulator’s utility function includes the total surplus in the unregulated and 
regulated markets and assume that ring-fencing mechanisms are absent. In this case, the 
regulator solves the following problem: 
  




































− U U U U U R U R R R U U U R R R p Q Q C c Q Q C p c p Q p p Q Max
R
φ φ λ λ
_ _ _ _ _









⎡ − + − U U U U U R U R R R Q Q C c Q Q C p φ φ  
 
In the same vein as in subsection 5.1, the firm’s profit constraint binds. Thus, the price in the 
regulated market is equal to: 
 
() () ( ) ()
R
U
U U U U U R R R Q
Q
Q C c Q C p ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − − = φ φ
_
 
and   18
() () () ( ) () ()
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U U U U R U R R Q
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D Q r W c D Q r K p ⎥ ⎦
⎤
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and the resulting regulator’s utility is equal to 
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If the regulator decides to establish a ring-fencing structure, there is no contamination between 
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Thus, the price in the regulated market is: 
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and the resulting regulator’s utility is 
 



































⎡ + − − + −








R R R c p Q
Q
Q
D r W c D r K p Q δ φ γ φ λ  
 
The difference between the utility with and without ring-fencing mechanisms is  ( )
R
R R R p p Q − λ , 
which can be written as:  
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U U U R
H
R U R R
R
R R R Q
Q
D r Q r D r Q r Q p p Q δ φ φ γ φ φ λ λ  (12) 
 
Thus, the regulator would establish a ring-fencing structure if and only if expression (12) is non-
negative.  
 
Moreover, it is easy to see that the term  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]
L
R U R R R
H
R U R C Q C D r Q r − = − φ γ φ φ  is always 
positive and refers to the utility diversification impact on the Regulated Division marginal cost in 
the absence of a ring-fencing structure. It is the cost of diversification, that is, the impact on the 
regulated market’s outcome due to an increase in the default risk (contamination process).  
 
Furthermore, the term  () () ( ) []() () [ ]
R
U H










D r Q r − = − φ δ φ φ  is always 
negative and refers to the utility’s diversification impact on the Unregulated Division marginal 
cost. It is the benefit of diversification, that is, the impact on the unregulated market’s outcome 
due to a reduction in the default risk (contamination process).  
 
In other words, the difference between the prices depends basically on the indirect impact of  U Q  
on the marginal cost functions and the relative size of the unregulated market diversification by 





. The weight of each variable is dictated by the initial market 
conditions. Furthermore, from (12) we know that a ring-fencing structure is preferable for the 
regulator if 
 
























σ = .  
 
Inequality (13) indicates that ring-fencing will be preferable if the Regulated Division’s cost of debt 
contamination is larger than the Unregulated Division’s cost of debt contamination multiplied by 
U Q σ . Therefore, it is easy to see that for any cost of debt function, the higher the σ the less   20
desirable it will be for the regulator to promote a ring-fencing structure.
11 While an increase in δ  
or  U D  reduces the chances of ring-fencing mechanisms being desirable, an increase in γ ,  R D  
or  R Q  increases the chances of a ring-fencing structure. 
 
Recall that δ  is the Unregulated Division’s debt amortization rate. An increase in δ  means that 
the Unregulated Division will pay a larger proportion of its debt and the impact of diversification on 
the Unregulated Division’s marginal cost becomes more pronounced and the benefit of 
diversification increases. Similar reasoning applies to the analysis of the effect of increasing  U D , 
the debt issued or rolled over throughout the period by the Unregulated Division. Moreover, an 
increase in γ , the Regulated Division’s debt amortization rate, means that the impact of 
diversification on the Regulated Division’s marginal cost increases because the Regulated 
Division will pay a larger proportion of its debt. Therefore, the cost of diversification increases. 
Again a similar reasoning applies to  R D , the debt issued or rolled over throughout the period by 
the Regulated Division. In addition and not surprisingly, an increase in  R Q  increases the chances 
of ring-fencing mechanisms being desirable because the larger the size of the regulated market 
the larger will be the cost of diversification in the case of default contamination. 
 
Inequality (13) also shows that because the cost of debt is a function of  U Q  the impact of this 
parameter on the regulator’s decision will depend on the cost of debt function. Substituting (5) in 
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    ( 1 5 )  
 
To address the impact ofα , β  and  U Q  on the desirability of ring-fencing mechanisms, it is easy 








U φ φ ≤ < 0 and 
                                                 
11 In the Appendix we provide a formal proof of this statement.   21
U
H
R Q α φ > . Thus, if  1 R  increases due to a change in an initial condition, it means that the 
chances of ring-fencing mechanisms being desirable have increased. In the Appendix we show 
that if α  grows then  1 R  grows and consequently the desirability of ring-fencing increases. 
However, if β  increases then  1 R  decreases and the desirability of ring-fencing mechanisms also 
decreases. Finally, if  U Q  increases then  1 R  can decrease or increase depending on the other 
initial conditions.     
 
An increase in α  means that the derivative of  R φ  with respect to  U Q  increases in module and, 
as a result, the impact of  U Q  in the Regulated Division’s rating function becomes more 
significant. On the other hand, an increase in β  also means that the impact of  U Q  in the 
Unregulated Division’s rating function increases but in the form of a benefit rather than a cost. 
This leads the regulator to avoid ring-fencing mechanisms. Finally, perhaps more surprisingly, we 
found that an increase in  U Q  can increase or decrease the chances of ring-fencing mechanisms 
being desirable. In fact, while  U Q  generates benefits to the Unregulated Division, it creates costs 
to the Regulated Division.  The analysis above is summarized by the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2: When the regulator’s utility function includes the unregulated market as well as 
the regulated market the desirability of a ring-fencing structure will depend on what initial market 
conditions satisfy inequality (15). The table below summarizes the effects of changing particular 
initial conditions, ceteris paribus, on the desirability of ring-fencing mechanisms.  
        
Increase in the 
Initial Condition 
Effect on the Desirability of 
Ring-Fencing Mechanisms 
δ   Reduction 
U D   Reduction 
γ   Increase 
R D   Increase 
α   Increase 
β   Reduction 
R Q   Increase 
U Q   Reduction, Increase   22
6. DISCUSSION 
 
This paper considers a situation where a firm that operates in a regulated market diversifies into 
an unregulated market. This diversification is efficient in the sense that the firm is an efficient 
provider in the unregulated market. Moreover, the cost of the Unregulated Division can be 
reduced; for example, when the parent firm uses revenue from the regulated business as 
collateral to raise funds to finance operation costs in the unregulated market. We label this 
phenomenon the contamination problem. Contamination unambiguously reduces the cost of the 
Unregulated Division, but it can affect adversely the cost of the Regulated Division. The 
mechanism through which contamination generates adverse effects is the credit rating.  
 
Rating agencies often examine both quantitative (financial) indicators and qualitative factors. 
Contamination can affect the credit rating of the Regulated Division through an agency’s 
subjective perception of the risk faced by the Regulated Division when its future revenues are 
committed in investments in the riskier unregulated market. Ring-fencing can be seen in this 
context as an effective isolator of risk. However, ring-fencing also eliminates (or more realistically 
mitigates) any cost reduction in the unregulated markets.  
 
Regulators often have requirements that regulated businesses can diversify into competitive 
markets as long as their credit rating is not too adversely affected (e.g., as long as the regulated 
division retains an investment grading). However, regulators also often mandate ring-fencing 
mechanisms of varying degrees of sophistication. In this sense, the discussion on the introduction 
of ring-fencing seems to focus only on its benefits and does not consider its (indirect) costs. 
 
The contribution of this paper is to show that a regulator that has a wider welfare function which 
includes total welfare from both regulated and unregulated markets, will not necessarily impose 
ring-fencing.
12 In particular, we show how the desirability of ring-fencing changes as the various 
cost parameters change.  
 
The analysis undertaken in this paper has also abstracted from the potentially significant direct 
costs of imposing ring-fencing mechanisms. These costs will vary with the stringency of ring-
fencing from accounting separation to division separation to structural break up, which in our case 
amounts to preventing the firm from diversifying into competitive markets. 
                                                 
12 In this paper, the assumption of inelastic demand in the competitive market based on Sappington (2003) 
implies that all cost savings in the competitive market are captured by the firm. However, if the demand in 
the competitive market were perfectly elastic, then it is not difficult to see that all the benefits would be 
captured by consumers.     23
 
Although there are no established empirical evaluations of the direct costs imposed by ring-
fencing, recent estimates from the telecommunications sector suggest that these costs can be 
substantial. For example, Crandall and Sidak (2002) estimate at $40 million the direct costs of the 
proposed structural separation of Verizon’s Pennsylvania operations. British Telecom reports that 
it faced a cost of £70 million for setting up its access services division BT Openreach under its 
voluntary division separation initiative.
13 Although these are estimates from more complex 
separation requirements in the telecommunications sector, they do suggest that imposing ring-
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Appendix 
 
In this Appendix we investigate the effect of changes in α , σ , β  and  U Q  on the desirability of 




R φ φ ,  defined 
by: 
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The boundary of R is a hyperbola, labelled H.  
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Also, we label C the intersection of H with the first quadrant. Note that the region above C is 
contained in R. 
 
It is easy to verify that the points of intersection of C with the 
H
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R Q α φ > . We define the region  1 R  as 
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At the point  0 =
H
R φ ,  0 =
L
U φ  we have  () U
L
U Q σ φ − = 0
'
 and at  U
H
R Q α φ = , 0 =
L
U φ  we have 
() U U
L




Proof that an increase in α increases the desirability of ring-fencing: 
 
In order to find the effect of the variation of α  on the area of  1 R   suppose that  2 1 α α <  and all 
other parameters are fixed. Then, we have two curves C: 
 









































































We claim that the corresponding regions  1 R , denoted by  ( ) 1 1 α R  and  ( ) 2 1 α R  have the following 
property: 
 
Area of  ( ) 1 1 α R  < Area of  ( ) 2 1 α R                     (17) 
 
For a sufficiently large domain  M Q
H
R U ≤ <φ α . 
 




U r r L φ φ = =  be the line with slope r ,  1 0 < < r , passing through zero. Define:  
 
() ( ) 1 1 α C L r p r ∩ =  and  ( ) ( ) 2 2 α C L r p r ∩ =  
 
Given  1 R , to prove (17) it suffices to show that  the tangent line to  ( ) 2 α C  at  () r p2  has a smaller 
slope than the tangent line to  () 1 α C  at  ( ) r p1 . To see this, note that   
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The slope of  () i C α at  () r pi  is: 
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Where 
2 r A = ,  () r Q B U 2 + = σ β ,  U Q r r C σ 2
2 + = ,  U Q D βσ =  and  U Q E σ = . From this we 
obtain  
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as  ( )
2 2 r Q r BC AD U + − = − σ β  
 








φ φ <  as we wanted to show.   
 
Proof that an increase in σ leads to a decrease in the desirability of ring-fencing: 
 
In order to find the effect of the variation of σ  on the area of  1 R  suppose that  2 1 σ σ <  and all 
the other parameters are kept constant. Again consider the hyperbolas: 
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The hyperbolas  () 1 σ C  and  () 2 σ C  pass through the points (0,0) and( ) 0 , U Q α . Their tangents at 
() 0 , U Q α  are   U Q 1 σ  and  U Q 2 σ , respectively. Since  U U Q Q 2 1 σ σ < , it is enough to show that 
() () 2 1 σ σ C C ∩  is empty in the open first quadrant. This will imply that  
 
Area of  ( ) 2 1 σ R  < Area of  ( ) 1 1 σ R  
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Q Q α α
φ , that is  0 , U
H
R Q α φ = . This means that the intersection 
() () 2 1 σ σ C C ∩  consists of two points: (0,0) and ( ) 0 , U Q α . 
 
Thus,  () () 2 1 σ σ C C ∩  is empty in the open first quadrant as we wanted to demonstrate.  
 
Proof that as β increases, the desirability of ring-fencing decreases: 
 
In order to find the effect of the variation of β  on the area of  1 R  we can observe below that β  




U φ φ  at the point ( ) 0 , U Q α . In fact, it is easy to see that  
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At the point  U
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R Q α φ = , 0 =
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By the Taylor Theorem we have that for 
H
R φ  near  U Q α : 
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Suppose that  2 1 β β <  and all other variables are kept constant. Then, we have the following two 
curves  () 1 β C  and  () 2 β C :  
 








































































We proceed now to prove that  () 1 β C  and  ( ) 2 β C  do not intersect in the open first quadrant. 
When β  varies, all other variables remain constant, the intersection  ( )( ) 2 1 β β C C ∩  is obtained 
as solution of the following system: 
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From this we obtain 
 












U Q Q φ β φ β φ β φ β    31
 
Thus,  0 =
L
U φ  and () 0 1 2 = −
L
U φ β β , that is,  0 =
L
U φ  again. This means that the intersection 
() () 2 1 β β C C ∩  consists of two points: (0,0) and ( ) 0 , U Q α . Consequently,  () () 2 1 β β C C ∩  is 
empty in the open first quadrant. 
 
In addition, near  U Q α  we have two curves T1 and T2 that have the following expressions: 
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Therefore, for 
H
R φ  near  U Q α : 
 








U φ φ φ φ <  
 
Since  () 1 β C  and  () 2 β C  do not intersect in the open first quadrant, then:  
 
Area of  ( ) 2 1 β R  < Area of  ( ) 1 1 β R   
 
Therefore, if β  increases then the area of  1 R  decreases.  
 
Proof that the impact of an increase in QU on the desirability of ring-fencing is dependent 
on the market initial conditions: 
 
In order to find the effect of the variation of  U Q  on the area of  1 R  suppose that  2 1 U U Q Q <  and 
all the other parameters are kept constant. Again consider the hyperbolas: 
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Writing  () () σ β α σ β α , , , ,
1





=  we can transform  () 1 U Q C  obtaining 
( ) () 2
* * * , , U Q C C = σ β α . This means that a change in  U Q  from  1 U Q  to  2 U Q  is equivalent to a 







, keeping  U Q fixed. 
Therefore, we can state the following: If the Area of  ( ) 1 1 , , , U Q R σ β α  < Area of 
( ) 1
* * *
1 , , , U Q R σ β α  then the Area of  ( ) 1 1 U Q R  < Area of  ( ) 2 1 U Q R . In this case when  U Q  grows 
then  1 R  grows and consequently the desirability of ring-fencing increases. 
 
 